The concept of multitolerance abstracts problems in system dependability and provides a basis for improved design of dependable systems. In the abstraction, each source of undependability in the system is represented as a class of faults, and the corresponding ability of the system to deal with that undependability source is represented as a type of tolerance. Multitolerance thus refers to the ability of the system to tolerate multiple fault-classes, each in a possibly di erent way.
Introduction
Dependability is an increasingly relevant system-level requirement that encompasses the ability of a system to deliver its service in a desirable manner, in spite of the occurrence of faults, security intrusions, safety hazards, con guration changes, load variations, etc. Achieving this ability is di cult, essentially because engineering a system for the sake of one dependability property, say availability in the presence of faults, often interferes with another desired dependability property, say security in presence of intrusions. In this paper, to e ectively reason about multiple dependability properties, we introduce the concept of multitolerance. Each source of undependability is treated as a class of \faults" and each dependability property is treated as a type of \tolerance". Thus, multitolerance refers to the ability of a system to tolerate multiple classes of faults, each in a possibly di erent way. Although there are many examples of multitolerant systems in practice 1 ?3] and there exists a growing body of research that presents instances of multitolerant systems 4?9], we are not aware of previous work that has considered the systematic design of multitolerance. Towards redressing this de ciency, we present in this paper a formal method for the design of multitolerant systems. To deal with the di culty of interference between multiple types of tolerances, our method is based on the use of components. More speci cally, a multitolerant system designed using the method consists of an intolerant system and a set of components, one for each desired type of tolerance. Thus, the method reduces the complexity of design to that of designing the components and that of correctly adding them to the intolerant system. Moreover, it enables reasoning about each type of tolerance and the interferences between di erent types of tolerance at the level of the components themselves, as opposed to involving the whole system. The method further reduces the complexity of adding multiple components to an intolerant system by adding each component in a stepwise fashion. In other words, the method considers the faultclasses that an intolerant system is subject to in some xed total order, say F1 :: Fn. A component is added to the intolerant system so that it tolerates F1 in a desirable manner. The resulting system is then augmented with another component so that it tolerates F2 in a desirable manner and its tolerance to F1 is preserved. This process of adding a new tolerance and preserving all old tolerances is repeated until all n fault-classes are accounted for. It follows that the nal system is multitolerant with respect to F1 :: Fn.
Components used in our method are built out of two building blocks, namely detectors and correctors, that occur |albeit implicitly| in fault-tolerant systems. Intuitively, a detector \detects" whether some predicate is satis ed by the system state; and a corrector detects whether some predicate is satis ed by the system state and also \corrects" the system state in order to satisfy that predicate whenever the predicate is not satis ed. Detectors can be used to ensure that each step of the system is \safe" with respect to its \problem speci cation", while correctors can be used to ensure that the system eventually reaches a state from where its problem speci cation is (re)satis ed. Thus, in this paper, we are also able to show that components built out of detectors are su cient for designing \fail-safe" tolerance in programs, that components built out of correctors are su cient for designing \nonmasking" tolerance in programs, and that components built out of both detectors and correctors are su cient for designing \masking" tolerance in programs. (We will formally de ne each of these terms shortly.)
De nition (Enabled). An action of p is enabled in a state i its guard (which is a state predicate) is true in that state.
De nition (Violates). p violates SPEC for S i it is not the case that p satis es SPEC for S; i.e., there exists a computation of p that starts at a state where S is true and is not in SPEC.
For convenience in reasoning about programs that satisfy special cases of problem speci cations, we introduce the following notational abbreviations.
De nition (Generalized Hoare-triples). fSg p fRg i p satis es the generalized pair (fSg; fRg) for true.
De nition (Closed in p). S is closed in p i p satis es S for true. Note that it is trivially true that the state predicates true and false are closed in p. De nition (Converges to in p). S converges to R in p i p satis es S converges to R for true. Informally speaking, proving the correctness of p with respect to SPEC involves showing that p satis es SPEC for some state predicate S. ( Of course, to be useful, the predicate S should not be false.) Now, since problem speci cations are su x closed, we may without loss of generality restrict our attention to proving that p satis es the problem speci cation for some closed state predicate S. We call such a state predicate S an invariant of p. Invariants enable proofs of program correctness that eschew operational arguments about long (sub)sequences of states, and are thus methodologically advantageous.
De nition (Invariant). S is an invariant of p for SPEC i S is closed in p and p satis es SPEC for S.
Notational remark. Henceforth, whenever the problem speci cation is clear from the context, we will omit it; thus, \S is an invariant of p" abbreviates \S is an invariant of p for SPEC ". One way to calculate an invariant of p is to characterize the set of states that are reachable under execution of p starting from some designated \initial" states. Experience shows, however, that for ease of proofs of program correctness one may prefer to use invariants of p that properly include such a reachable set of states. This is a key reason why we have not included initial states in the de nition of programs. Techniques for the design of invariants have been articulated by Dijkstra 11] , using the notion of auxiliary variables, and by Gries 12] , using the heuristics of state predicate ballooning and shrinking. Techniques for the mechanical calculation of invariants have been discussed by Alpern and Schneider 13] .
Faults.
The faults that a program is subject to are systematically represented by actions whose execution perturbs the program state. We emphasize that such representation is possible notwithstanding the type of the faults (be they stuck-at, crash, fail-stop, omission, timing, performance, or Byzantine), the nature of the faults (be they permanent, transient, or intermittent), or the ability of the program to observe the e ects of the faults (be they detectable or undetectable).
De nition (Fault-class). A fault-class for p is a set of actions over the variables of p. Let It is important to note that there may be multiple such state predicates T for which p meets the above three requirements. Each of these multiple T state predicates captures a (potentially di erent) type of fault-tolerance of p. We will exploit this multiplicity in Section 6 in order to de ne multitolerance.
Types of fault-tolerances. We now classify three types of fault-tolerances that a program can exhibit, namely masking, nonmasking, and fail-safe tolerance, using the above de nition of F-tolerance.
Informally speaking, this classi cation is based upon the extent to which the program satis es its problem speci cation in the presence of faults. Of the three, masking is the strictest type of tolerance: in the presence of faults, the program always satis es its safety speci cation, and the execution of p after execution of actions in F yields a computation that is in both the safety and liveness speci cation of p, i.e., the computation is in the problem speci cation of p. Nonmasking is less strict than masking: in the presence of faults, the program need not satisfy its safety speci cation but, when faults stop occurring, the program eventually resumes satisfying both its safety and liveness speci cation; i.e., the computation has a su x that is in the problem speci cation. Fail-safe is also less strict than masking: in the presence of faults, the program always satis es its safety speci cation but, when faults stop occurring, the program need not resume satisfying its liveness speci cation; i.e., the computation is in the safety speci cation {but not necessarily in the liveness speci cation{ of p. Formally, these three types of tolerance may be expressed in terms of the de nition of F-tolerance, Notation. In the sequel, whenever the fault-class F and invariant S are clear from the context, we omit them; thus, \masking tolerant" abbreviates \masking tolerant to F for S", and so on.
Detectors
In this section, we de ne the rst of two building blocks which are su cient for the design of fault-tolerant programs, namely detectors. We also present the properties of detectors, show how to construct them in a hierarchical and e cient manner, and discuss their role in the design of fault-tolerance. As mentioned in the introduction, intuitively, a detector is a program that \detects" whether a given state predicate is true in the current system state. Implementations of detectors abound in practice: Wellknown examples include comparators, error detection codes, consistency checkers, watchdog programs, snoopers, alarms, snapshot procedures, acceptance tests, and exception conditions. In d1 ]d2, since d1 and d2 perform their detection concurrently, the time required for detection of X1^X2 is the maximum time taken to detect X1 and to detect X2. ( We are assuming that the unit for measuring time allows both d1 and d2 to attempt execution of an action each.) Also, the space complexity of d1 ]d2 is the sum of the space complexity of d1 and d2, since the state space of d1 ]d2 is the union of the state space of d1 and of d2. Sequential composition of detectors. In the sequential composition of d1 and d2, denoted by d1; d2, d2 executes only after d1 has completed its detection, i.e., after the witness predicate Z1 is true. Formally, the sequential composition of d1 and d2 is the program whose set of variables is the union of the variables of d1 and d2 and whose set of actions is the union of the actions of d1 and of Z1^d2. We postulate the axiom that`;' is left-associative: d1; d2; d3 = (d1; d2); d3. Observe that`;' is not commutative, that`;' distributes over` ]': d1; (d2 ]d3) = (d1; d2) ](d1; d3), and that`^' distributes over`;': g^(d1; d2) = (g^d1); (g^d2). Suppose, again, that the variables of d1 and d2 are mutually exclusive. In this case, starting from any state where X1^X2 is true continuously, d1 eventually truthi es Z1. Only after Z1 is truthi ed are the actions of d2 executed; these actions eventually truthify Z2. Since Z2 is truthi ed only when Z1 (and, hence, X1) and X2 are true, it also follows that U ) (Z2 ) X1^X2) provided we assume U ) (Z2 ) X1). Theorem 3.3 Let Z1 detect X1 in d1 for U and Z2 detect X2 in d2 for U^X1.
If the variables of d1 and d2 are mutually exclusive, and U ) (Z2 ) X1) then Z2 detects X1^X2 in d1; d2 for U In d1; d2, the time (respectively, space) taken to detect X1^X2 is the sum of the time (respectively, space) taken to detect X1 and to detect X2. The extra time taken by d1; d2 as compared to d1 ]d2 is warranted in cases where the witness predicate Z2 can be witnessed atomically but Z1^Z2 cannot.
Example: Memory access. Let us consider a simple memory access program that obtains the value stored at a given address (cf. Figure 1 ). The program is subject to two fault-classes: The rst consists of protection faults which cause the given address to be corrupted so that it falls outside the valid address space, and the second consists of page faults which remove the address and its value from the memory.
For tolerance to the rst fault-class, there is a detector d1 that uses the page table TBL to detect whether the address addr is valid (X1). For tolerance to the second fault-class, there is another detector d2 that uses the memory MEM to detect whether the given address is in memory (X2). Z1 detects X1 in d1 for U1 (1) Z2 detects X2 in d2 for U1^X1 (2) Note that an appropriate choice of initial state in U1 would be one where both Z1 and Z2 are false. Note also that, in U1, Z1 is truthi ed only when X1 is true and that Z2 is truthi ed only when X1 and X2 are both true.
To detect X1^X2, we may compose d1 and d2 sequentially: d1 would rst detect X1, and then d2 would detect X2. From Theorem 3.3, (1) and (2) we get:
Z2 detects X1^X2 in d1; d2 for U1 (3) Application to design of fault-tolerance. Detectors su ce to ensure that a program satis es its safety speci cation. To see this, recall that a safety speci cation essentially rules out certain nite pre xes of program computation. Now, consider any pre x of a computation that is not ruled out by the safety speci cation. Execution of a program action starting from this pre x does not violate the safety speci cation i the elongated pre x is not ruled out by the safety speci cation.
In other words, for each program action ac there exists a set of computation pre xes from which execution of ac does not violate the safety speci cation. It follows that there exists a \detection" state predicate such that execution of ac in any state where that state predicate is true does not violate the safety speci cation. (From the fusion closure of the safety speci cation, it su ces that this state predicate characterize a set of states, each state st of which yields upon executing ac a successor state st 0 such that there is some state sequence in the safety speci cation in which st and st 0 occur consecutively in that order.) Now, if detectors can be added to the program so that for each program action ac a detection predicate of ac is witnessed, and each program action can be restricted to execute only if its corresponding witness predicate is true, the resulting program satis es the safety speci cation.
To design fail-safe tolerance to F for S, we need to ensure that upon starting from a state where S is true, the execution of p in the presence of F always yields a computation that is in the safety speci cation of p. It follows that detectors su ce for the design of fail-safe tolerance.
Likewise, to design masking tolerance to F for S, we need to ensure that upon starting from a state where S is true, the execution of p in the presence of F never violates the safety speci cation and the execution of p after execution of actions in F always yields a computation that is in both the safety and the liveness speci cation of p, i.e., that computation is in the problem speci cation of p. (From the fusion closure of the problem speci cation, it follows that a computation of p that is in the safety speci cation and that has a su x in the problem speci cation is itself in the problem speci cation.) Now, regarding safety, it su ces that detectors be added to p. (Regarding liveness, it su ces that correctors be added to p, as discussed in the next section.)
Detectors can also play a role in the design of nonmasking tolerance: They may be used to detect whether the program is perturbed to a state where its invariant is false. As discussed in the next section, such detectors can be systematically composed with correctors that restore the program to a state where its invariant is true.
Correctors
In this section, we discuss the second set of building blocks, namely correctors, in a manner analogous to our discussion of detectors. As mentioned in the introduction, intuitively, a corrector is a detector that also \corrects" the program state whenever it detects that its detection predicate is false in the current system state. Implementations of correctors also abound in practice: Wellknown examples include voters, error correction codes, reset procedures, rollback recovery, rollforward recovery, constraint (re)satisfaction, exception handlers, and alternate procedures in recovery blocks. c1 ]c2 to correct X1^X2 is the maximum of the time taken to correct X1 and to correct X2. The space taken is the corresponding sum. Sequential composition of correctors. The sequential composition of correctors c1 and c2, denoted by c1; c2, is the program whose set of variables is the union of the variables of c1 and c2 and whose set of actions is the union of the actions of c1 and of Z1^c2. Theorem 4.3 Let Z1 correct X1 in c1 for U and Z2 correct X2 in c2 for (U^X1).
If the variables of c1 and c2 are mutually exclusive, and U ) (Z2 ) X1) then Z2 corrects X1^X2 in c1; c2 for U The time (respectively, space) taken by c1; c2 to correct X1^X2 is the sum of the time (respectively, space) taken to correct X1 and to correct X2. As mentioned in the previous section, one way to design a corrector for X is by sequential composition of a detector and a corrector: the detector rst detects whether :X is true and, using this witness, the corrector then establishes X. X2 corrects X2 in c for true (4) X2 corrects X2 in c for U1 (5) X2 corrects X2 in c for U1^X1 (6) Before detector d2 can witness that the value of the address is in memory, corrector c should execute. Hence, we compose c and d2 sequentially. From Corollary 4.7, (2) and (6) Z2 corrects X1^X2 in d1; (c; d2) for U1^X1 (8) Application to design of fault-tolerance. Correctors su ce to ensure that computations of a program have a su x in the problem speci cation. To see this, observe that if the correction predicate of a corrector is chosen to be an invariant of the program, the corrector ensures the program will eventually reach a state where that invariant is true and henceforth the program computation is in the problem speci cation.
To design nonmasking tolerance to F for an invariant S, we need to ensure that upon starting from a state where S is true, execution of p will, after execution of actions in F, always yield a computation that has a su x in the problem speci cation. It follows that correctors whose correction predicate is the invariant S su ce for the design of nonmasking tolerance. Likewise, to design masking tolerance to F for S, we need to ensure that upon starting from a state where S is true, execution of p in the presence of F never violates its safety speci cation and execution of p after execution of actions in F always yields a computation that is in the problem speci cation of p. For the latter guarantee, it su ces that correctors be added to p (and, for the former, it su ces that detectors be added to p, as discussed in the previous section).
Composition of Detector/Corrector Components and Programs
In this section, we discuss how a detector/corrector component is correctly added to a program so that the resulting program satis es the speci cation of the component. As far as possible, the proof of preservation should be simpler than explicitly proving all over again that the speci cation is satis ed in the resulting program. This is achieved by a compositional proof that shows that the program does not \interfere" with the component, i.e., the program and the component when executed concurrently do not violate the speci cation of the component. (9) 6 Designing Multitolerance
In this section, we rst de ne multitolerance and then present our method for compositional, stepwise design of multitolerant programs.
De nition. Let Example: Memory access (continued). Observe that the memory access program, d1; (c; d2); p, discussed in Section 5, is multitolerant to the classes of protection faults and page faults: it is failsafe tolerant to the former and masking tolerant to latter. In particular, in the presence of a page fault, it always obtains the correct data from the memory. And in the presence of a protection fault, it obtains no data value.
Compositional and stepwise design method. As outlined in the introduction, our method starts with a fault-intolerant program and, in a stepwise manner, considers the fault-classes in some xed total order, say F1::Fn. In the rst step, the intolerant program is augmented with detector and/or corrector components so that it is l1-tolerant to F1. The resulting program is then augmented with other detector/corrector components, in the second step, so that it is l2-tolerant to F2 and its l1-tolerance to F1 is preserved. And so on until, in the n-th step, the ln-tolerance to Fn is added while preserving the l1::ln?1tolerances to F1::Fn?1. The multitolerant program designed thus has the structure shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 : Structure of a multitolerant program designed using our method First step. Let p be the intolerant program with invariant S. By calculating an F1-span of p for S, detector and corrector components can be designed for satisfying l1-tolerance to F1. As discussed in Section 3 and 4, it su ces to add detectors to design fail-safe tolerance to F1, correctors to design nonmasking tolerance to F1, and both detectors and correctors to design masking tolerance to F1. Note that the detectors and correctors added to p are also subject to F. Hence, they themselves have to be tolerant to F. But it is not necessary that they be masking tolerant to F. More speci cally, it su ces that detectors added to design fail-safe tolerance be themselves fail-safe tolerant to F; this is because if the detectors do not satisfy their liveness speci cation in the presence of F, the resulting program can be made to not satisfy the liveness speci cation of p in the presence of F. Likewise, it su ces that correctors added to design nonmasking tolerance be themselves nonmasking tolerant to F; this is because as long as the computations of the correctors have su xes that are in their safety and liveness speci cation, the computations of the resulting program can be made to have su xes in the safety and liveness speci cation of p. Lastly, as can be expected, it su ces that the detectors and correctors added to design masking tolerance be themselves masking tolerant to F. (See Figure   5 .)
In practice, the detectors and correctors added to p often possess the desired tolerance to F trivially. But if they do not, one way to design them to be tolerant to F is by the analogous addition of more detectors and correctors. Another way is to design them to be self tolerant, without using any more detector and corrector components, as is exempli ed by self-checking, self-stabilizing, and inherently fault-tolerant designs. With the addition of detector and/or corrector components to p, it remains to show that, in the resulting program p1, the components do not interfere with p and that p does not interfere with the components. Note that p1 may contain variables and actions that were not in p and, hence, invariants and fault-spans of p1 may di er from those of p. Therefore, letting S1 be an invariant of p1 and T1 be an F1-span of p1 for S1, we show the following.
1. In the absence of F1, i.e., in states where S1 is true, the components do not interfere with p, i.e., each computation of p is in the problem speci cation even if it executes concurrently with the new components.
2. In the presence of F1, i.e., in states where T1 is true, p does not interfere with the components, i.e., each computation of the components is in the components' speci cation (in the sense prescribed by its type of tolerance) even if they execute concurrently with p.
The addition of the detectors and correctors may itself be simpli ed by using a stepwise approach: Second step. This step adds l2-tolerance to F2 and preserves the l1-tolerance to F1. To add l2-tolerance to F2, just as in the rst step, we add new detector and corrector components to p1. Then, we account for the possible interference between the executions of these added components and of p1. More speci cally, letting S2 be an invariant of the resulting program p2, T21 be an F1-span of p2 for S2, and T22 denote an F2-span of p2 for S2, we show the following.
Remaining steps. For the remaining steps of the design, where we add tolerance to F3::Fn, the procedure of the second step is generalized accordingly.
Case Study in Multitolerance Design : Token Ring
Recall the mutual exclusion problem: Multiple processes may each access their critical section provided that at any time at most one process is accessing its critical section. Moreover, no process should wait forever to access its critical section, assuming that each process leaves its critical section in nite time. Mutual exclusion is readily achieved by circulating a token among processes and letting each process enter its critical section only if it has the token. In a token ring program, in particular, the processes are organized in a ring and the token is circulated along the ring in a xed direction. In this case study, we design a multitolerant token ring program. The program is masking tolerant to any number, K, of faults that each corrupt the state of some process detectably. Its tolerance is continuous in the sense that if K state corruptions occur, it corrects its state within (K) time. Thus, a quantitatively unique measure of tolerance is provided to each FK, where FK is the faultclass that causes at most K state corruptions of processes.
By detectable corruption of the state of a process, we mean that the corrupted state is detected by that process before any action inadvertently accesses that state. The state immediately before the corruption may, however, be lost. (For our purposes, it is irrelevant as to what caused the corruption; i.e., whether it was due to the loss of a message, the duplication of a message, timing faults, the crash and subsequent restart of a process, etc.) We proceed as follows: First, we describe a simple token ring program that is intolerant to detectable state corruptions. Then, we add detectors and correctors so as to achieve masking tolerance to the fault that corrupts the state of one process. Progressively, we add more detectors and correctors so as to achieve masking tolerance to the fault-class that corrupts process states at most K, K > 1, times. ), which denotes a sequence of length N +1 consisting of zeros followed by ones or ones followed by zeros. Thus, an invariant of the program TR is S TR = X 2 ( S l : 0 l N +1 : (0 l 1
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7.2 Adding Tolerance to 1 State Corruption Based on our assumption that state corruption is detectable, we introduce a special value ?, such that when any process j detects that its state (i.e., the value of x:j) is corrupted, it resets x:j to ?.
We can now readily design masking tolerance to a single corruption of state at any process j by ensuring that (i) the value of x:j is eventually corrected so that it is no longer ? and (ii) in the interim, no process (in particular, j+1) inadvertently gets the token as a result of the corruption of x:j.
For (i), we add a corrector at each process j: it corrects x:j from ? to a value that is either 0 or 1. The corrector at j, j 6 = 0, copies x:(j ?1); the corrector at j, j = 0, copies x:N + 2 1. Thus, the corrector action at j has the same statement as the action of TR at j, and we can merge the corrector and TR actions.
For (ii), we add a detector at each process j : Its detection predicate is x:(j?1)6 = ? and it has no actions. The witness predicate of this detector (which, in this case, is the detection predicate itself) is used to restrict the actions of program TR at j. Hence, the actions of TR at j execute only when x:(j?1) 6 = ? is true. As a result, the execution of actions of TR is always safe (i.e., these actions cannot inadvertently generate a token). Consider the detector at j: Both its detection and witness predicates are x:(j?1) 6 = ?. Since the detects relation is trivially re exive in its rst two arguments, it follows that x:(j?1) 6 = ? detects x:(j?1) 6 = ? in PTR. In other words, the detector is not interfered by any other actions. Consider the corrector at j: Both its correction and witness predicates are x:j 6 = ?. Since the program actions are identical to the corrector actions, by Theorem 5.1, the corrector actions are not interfered by the actions of TR. Also, since the detectors have no actions, the detectors at processes other than j do not interfere with the corrector at j; moreover, since at most one x value is set to ?, when x:j =? and thus the corrector at j is enabled, the witness predicate of the detector at j is true and hence the corrector at j is not interfered by the detector at j. Consider the program actions of TR: Their safety follows from the safety of the detectors, described above. And, their progress follows from the progress of the correctors, which ensure that starting from a state where S PTR is true and a process state is corrupted every computation of PTR reaches a state where S TR is true, and the progress of the detectors, which ensures that no action of TR is inde nitely blocked from executing. Observe that our proof of mutual interference-freedom illustrates that we do not have to re-prove the correctness of TR for the new invariant. Observe, also, that if the state of process j is corrupted then within (1) time the corrector at j corrects the state of j.
Adding Tolerance to 2::N State Corruptions
The proof of non-interference of program PTR can be generalized to show that PTR is also masking tolerant to the fault-class that twice corrupts process state. The generalization is self-evident for the case where the state corruptions are separated in time so that the rst one is corrected before the second one occurs. For the case where both state corruptions occur concurrently, say at processes j and k, we need to show that the correctors at j and k truthify x:j 6 = ? and x:k 6 = ?, without interference by each other and the other actions of the program. Let us consider two subcases: (i) j and k are non-neighboring, and (ii) j and k are neighboring. For the rst subcase, j and k correct x:j and x:k from their predecessors j?1 and k?1, respectively. This execution is equivalent to the parallel composition of the correctors at j and k. By Theorem 4.2, PTR reaches a state where x:j and x:k are not ?. For the second subcase (letting j be the predessor of k), j corrects x:j from its predecessor j ?1, truthi es x:j 6 =? and then terminates. Since the corrector at j does not read any variables written by the corrector at k. Thus, from the analogue of Theorem 5.0 for the case of correctors, the corrector at j is not interfered by the corrector at k. After x:j 6 = ? is truthi ed, the corrector at k corrects x:k from its predecessor j. By Theorem 4.4, the corrector at k is not interfered by the corrector at j. Since the correctors at j and k do not interfere with each other, it follows that the program reaches a state where x:j and x:k are not ?. In fact, as long as the number of faults is at most N, there exists at least one process j with x:j 6 =?.
PTR ensures that the state of such a j eventually causes j+1 to correct its state to x:(j + 1)6 =?. Such corrections will continue until no process has its x value set to ?. Hence, PTR tolerates up to N faults and the time required to converge to S TR is (K), where K is the number of faults.
Adding Tolerance to More Than N State Corruptions
Unfortunately, if more than N faults occur, program PTR deadlocks i it reaches a state where the x value of all processes is ?. To be masking tolerant to the fault-classes that corrupt the state of processes more than N times, a corrector is needed that detects whether the state of all processes is ? and, if so, corrects the program to a state where the x value of some process (say 0) to be equal to 0 or 1.
Since the x values of all processes cannot be accessed simultaneously, the corrector detects in a sequential manner whether the x values of all processes are ?. Let the detector added for this purpose at process j be denoted as dj and the (sequentially composed) detector that detects whether the x values of all processes is corrupted be dN; d(N ?1); :::; d0. To design dj, we add a value > to the domain of x:j. When dN detects that x:N is equal to ?, it sets x:N to >. Likewise, when dj, j < N, detects that x:j is equal to ?, it sets x:j to >. Note that since dj is part of the sequential composition, it is restricted to execute only after j+1 has completed its detection, i.e., when x:(j+1) is equal to >. It follows that when j completes its detection, the x values of processes j::N are corrupted. In particular, when d0 completes its detection, the x values of all processes are corrupted. Hence, when x:0 is set to >, it su ces for the corrector to reset x:0 to 0. To ensure that while the corrector is executing, no process inadvertently gets the token as a result of the corruption of x:j, we add detectors that restrict the actions of PTR at j+1 to execute only in states where x:j 6 => is true.
Actions. Program FTR consists of ve actions at each process j. Like PTR, the rst two actions, FTR1 and FTR2, pass the token from j to j+1 and are restricted by the trivial detectors to execute only when x:(j?1) is neither ? nor >. Action FTR3 is dN; it lets process N change x:N from ? to >. Action FTR4 is dj for j < N. Action FTR5 is the corrector action at process 0: it lets process 0 correct x:0 from > to 0. Formally, these actions are as follows: From (1) and (2) 
Discussion
In this section, we address some of the issues that our method for design of multitolerance has raised. We also discuss the motivation for the design decisions made in this work. Our formalization of the concept of multitolerance uses the abstractions of closure and convergence. Can other abstractions be used to formalize multitolerance? What are the advantages of using closure and convergence? In principle, one can formulate the concept of multitolerance using abstractions other than closure and convergence. As pointed out by John Rushby 21] , the approaches to formulate fault-tolerance can be classi ed into two: speci cation approaches and calculational approaches. In speci cation approaches, a system is regarded as a composition of several subsystems, each with a standard speci cation and one or more failure speci cations. A system is fault-tolerant if it satis es its standard speci cation when all components do, and one of its failure speci cations if some of its components depart from their standard speci cation. One example of this approach is due to Herlihy and Wing 22] who thus formulate graceful degradation, which is a special case of multitolerance. In calculational approaches, the set of computations permissible in the presence of faults is calculated. A system is said to be fault-tolerant if this set satis es the speci cation of the system (or an acceptably degraded version of it). Our approach is calculational since we compute the set of states that are potentially reachable in the presence of faults (fault-span). While other approaches may be used to formulate the design of multitolerance, we are not aware of any formal methods for design of multitolerance using them. Moreover, in our experience, the structure imposed by abstractions of closure and convergence has proven to be bene cial in several ways: (1) it has enabled us to discover the role of detectors and correctors in the design of all tolerance properties (cf. Sections 3 and 4) ; (2) For example, to represent Byzantine faults that a ects a process j, we may introduce an auxiliary boolean variable byz:j that is true i j is Byzantine. If j is not Byzantine, it executes its \normal" actions. Otherwise, it executes some \abnormal" actions. When the Byzantine fault occurs, byz:j is truthi ed, thus, permitting j to execute its abnormal actions. Similarly, to represent fail-stop and repair faults that a ects a process j, we may introduce an auxiliary boolean variable down:j that is true i j has fail-stopped. All actions of j are restricted to be executed only when down:j is false. When a fail-stop fault occurs, down:j is truthi ed, thus preventing j from executing its actions. When a repair occurs, down:j is falsi ed.
We have assumed that problem speci cations are su x closed and fusion closed. Where are these assumptions exploited in the design method? Do these assumptions restrict the applicability of the method?
We have used these assumptions in three places: (1) Su x closure of problem speci cations implies the existence of invariant state predicates. (2) Fusion closure of problem speci cations implies the existence of correction state predicates. (3) Su x closure and fusion closure of problem speci cations imply that the corresponding safety speci cations are fusion closed, which, in turn, implies the existence of detection state predicates.
These assumptions are not restrictive in the following sense: Let L be a set of state sequences that is not su x closed and/or not fusion closed and let p be a program. Then, it can be shown that by adding history variables to the variables of p, there exists a problem speci cation L 0 such that the following condition holds: all computations of p that start at states where some \initial" state predicate is true are in L i p satis es L 0 for some state predicate. Thus, the language of problem speci cations is not restrictive. How would our method of considering the fault-classes one-at-a-time compare with a method that considers them altogether? There is a sense in which the one-at-a-time and the altogether methods are equivalent: programs designed by the one method can also be designed by the other method. To justify this informally, let us consider a program p designed by using the altogether method to tolerate fault-classes F1, F2, ... , Fn. Program p can also be designed using the one-at-a-time method as follows: Let p1 be a subprogram of p that tolerates F1. This is the program designed in the rst stage of the one-at-a-time method. Likewise, let p2 be a subprogram of p that tolerates F1 and F2. This is the program designed in the second stage of the one-at-a-time method. And so on, until p is designed.
To complete the argument of equivalence, it remains to observe that a program designed by the one-at-a-time n-stage method can trivially be designed by the altogether method.
In terms of software engineering practice, however, the two methods would exhibit di erences. Towards identifying these di erences, we address three issues: (i) the structure of the programs designed using the two methods, (ii) the complexity of using them, and (iii) the complexity of the programs designed using them. On the rst issue, the stepwise method may yield programs that are better structured. This is exempli ed by our hierarchical token ring program which consists of three layers: the basic program that transmits the token, a corrector for the case when at least one process is not corrupted, and a corrector for the case when all processes are corrupted On the second issue, since we consider one fault-class at a time, the complexity of each step is less than the complexity of the altogether program. For example, in the token ring program, we rst handled the case where the state of some process is not corrupted. Then, we handled the only case where the state of all processes is corrupted. Thus, each step was simpler than the case where we would need to consider both these cases simultaneously.
On the third issue, it is possible that considering all fault-classes at a time may yield a program whose complexity is (in some sense) optimal with respect to each fault-class, whereas the one-ata-time approach may yield a program that is optimal for some, but not all, fault-classes. This suggests two considerations for the use of our method. One, the order in which the fault-classes are considered should be chosen with care. (Again, in principle, programs designed with one order can be designed by any other order. But, in practice, di erent orders may yield di erent programs, and the complexity of these programs may be di erent.) And, two, in choosing how to design the tolerance for a particular fault-class, a \lookahead" may be warranted into the impact of this design choice on the design of the tolerances to the remaining fault-classes. How does our compositional method a ect the trade-o s between dependability properties? Our method makes it possible to reason about the trade-o s locally, i.e., focusing attention only on the components corresponding to those dependability properties, as opposed to globally, i.e., by considering the entire program. Thus, our method facilitates reasoning about trade-o s between dependability properties.
Moreover, as can be expected, if the desired dependability properties are impossibility to cosatisfy, it will follow that there do not exist components that can be added to the program while complying with the interference-freedom requirements of our method. How does our compositional design method compare with the existing methods for designing faulttolerant programs? Our compositional design method is rich in the sense that it subsumes various existing fault-tolerance design methods such as replication, checkpointing and recovery, Schneider's state machine approach, exception handling, and Randell's recovery blocks. (The interested reader is referred to 20, 24] for a detailed discussion of how properties such as replication, agreement, and order are designed by interference-free composition within our method.)
How are fault-classes derived? Can our method be used if it is di cult to characterize the faults the system is subject to? Derivation of fault-classes is application speci c. It begins with the identi cation of the faults that the program may be subject to. Each of these faults is then formally characterized using state perturbations. (As mentioned above, auxiliary variables may be introduced in this formalization.) The desired type of tolerance for each fault is then speci ed. Finally, the faults are grouped into (possibly overlapping) fault-classes, based on the characteristics of the faults or their corresponding types of tolerance.
If it is di cult to characterize the faults in an application, a user of our method is obliged to guess some large enough fault-class that would accommodate all possible faults. It is often for this reason that designers choose weak models such as self-stabilization (where the state may be perturbed arbitrarily) or Byzantine failure (where the program may behave arbitrarily).
Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In this paper, we formalized the notion of multitolerance to abstract a variety of problems in dependability. It is worthwhile to point out that multitolerance has other related applications as well. One is to reason about graceful degradation with respect to progressively increasing fault-classes. Another is to guarantee di erent qualities of service (QoS) with respect to di erent user requirements and tra cs. A third one is to reason about adaptivity of systems with respect to di erent modes of environment behavior. We also presented a simple, compositional method for designing multitolerant programs, that added detector and corrector components for providing each desired type of tolerance. The addition of multiple components to an intolerant program was made tractable by adding tolerances to faultclasses one at a time. To avoid re-proving the correctness of the program in every step, we provided a theory for ensuring mutual interference-freedom in compositions of detectors and correctors with the intolerant program. To our knowledge, this is the rst formal method for the design of multitolerant programs. Our method is e ective for the design of quantitative as well as qualitative tolerances. As an example of quantitative tolerance, we presented a token ring protocol that recovers from upto K faults in (K) time. For examples of qualitative tolerances, we refer the interested reader to our designs of multitolerant programs for barrier computations, repetitive Byzantine agreement, mutual exclusion, tree maintenance, leader election, bounded-space distributed reset, and termination detection 23, 24, 26, 27] . To apply our design method in practice, we are currently developing SIEFAST, a simulation and implementation environment that enables stepwise implementation and validation of multitolerant distributed programs. We are also studying the mechanical synthesis of multitolerant concurrent programs.
